Abstract-In recent years, Android based smartphones have become popular. As a feature of a smart phone, much information for identifying a user and information linked to user's privacy is saved in a terminal. For this feature, many malwares targeting privacy information are developed. Many security mechanisms are provided in Android for such malwares. However, it is difficult for users to judge the availability of application by understanding the potential threats in the application. In this paper, we focus on acquisition of information by using a remote procedure call when we invoke the API to acquire phone ID. We design a methodology to record invocation of the API by inserting Log.v methods. Proposal method is implemented within Android framework layer. For this reason, malicious application developers cannot circumvent log output by their malwares. We examined our method, and confirmed empirically the record of the invocation behavior of the API to acquire phone ID.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Android phone is becoming popular. Simultaneously, many malicious applications called malware are developed for Android platform. Many Android malwares cause information leakages, and leakage of personal information is a big problem. There is a security mechanism called Permission [1] [2] that informs users of applications' behavior. However, it is difficult for a user to grasp threats of an application and judge the risk of it. Therefore, detection of malwares is important before they are distributed in markets. The details of permission are described in Section III-B. We would like to thank Ayumu Kubota and Takamasa Isohara, KDDI R&D Labs for giving beneficial advices. This work was supported by Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)(23300027), Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS).
There are dynamic analysis and static analysis in approach of malware detection. However, in static analysis, overlooking may increase when the variants of the malware outbreak. In dynamic analysis, there are some problems too. With dynamic analysis, overhead of operation increases. Moreover, there is a possibility that a malicious developer can make his application to circumvent the detection. In order to solve these problems, we focus on detection method using log output which is dynamic analysis.
Linux debug utility named strace monitors system calls used by an application in Android. There is a method performing malware detection by analyzing system calls that are obtained using the strace. Behavior using services of the kernel can be detected by this method. However, there is a problem that system call is not issued in the behavior which doesn't use services of kernel, and it is impossible to detect such a behavior.
We focus on the fact that when API that retrieves the phoneID is invoked, it is processed with remote procedure call. We propose a method logging the invocations in accordance with the API by inserting Log.v method. The logging by this technique cannot be avoided even if modification of API is performed on the caller side. Therefore, it is impossible to circumvent the detection even if a developer has malicious intention. Because this proposal method is implemented within Android framework layer, malicious application developer cannot interfere with modifications in this layer. In this paper, we implemented proposal method tentatively and ran the application which acquires phoneID on the Android emulator. As a consequence, we confirm empirically record of invocation behavior of the phoneID acquisition API.
Proposal techniques can be used to grasp a behavior of Android application. As a countermeasure for Android malwares, an examination of application using proposal method can be applied. For example, distribution of malwares may be prevented if Android market vendors examine applications in advance. 
II. ANDROID
Android is a platform that was developed targeting mobile information devices such as smart phones and tablet PCs. Android application is running on the Dalvik virtual machine(VM). When an Android application is launched, one Dalvik VM is dedicated to execute that application. When a user installs an application, by approving permissions, it becomes possible to take the cooperation with other applications or access files made by other applications deviating from the sandbox mechanism [1].
A. Android Application
Android consists of a Linux based OS kernel, a middleware and fundamental applications. Figure 1 shows the Android Architecture image. The applications used by the user are on the top layer in AndroidOS. Developers can publish applications in the Android market.
In the application framework of Android, API is provided and Android application developer can incorporate it into his applications. Application developers can use the result the API outputs by this mechanism, without knowing about the complicated procedures under the framework layer.
In AndroidOS, the independence of applications is maintained by the following mechanisms so that applications don't cause interference.
• Application execution and process Android application is executed in an individual Linux process allocated to this sole application. Hence, a Linux process is started when an application is executed. However, this process is terminated when system resources are required from other applications, after this application is finished.
• Dalvik virtual machine allocation to every process In Android, a Dalvik virtual machine is allocated to every process exclusively. In this way, one application is executed independently from other applications.
• Unique Linux user ID allocated to every application During the installation, to every application is allocated unique ID. The assigned ID serves as an owner of the application, and manages the process. Files that the application creates are set up so that these files cannot be fundamentally read from applications which have other ID. For this reason, a file created by a certain application cannot be freely read from an application with other ID. In this section, we will explain the following elements which characterize Android applications' behaviors. 1) Component: Android applications consist of some components. Typical components which an Android application has are bellowing two.
• Activity Activity is a component which is equivalent to the screen of an application. A certain activity express one screen of an application, and if that application uses some screens, it will use the same number of activities fundamentally. When an application has two or more screens and changes the screens according to a user's operation, activities also change. Moreover, when trying to get to know about behaviors of activities, it is necessary to understand the life cycle of activities.
• Service Service is a class for backgrounds operations which don't appear on screens. For example, when continuing to play music in parallel to other operations, it is effective to implement music player applications as service. An application binds itself to an service, in order to invoke the function which that service offers. Moreover, the methods which control a life cycle exist in Service class as well as activity. 2) Inter-Component Communication: As mentioned in Section II-A.1, there are two components in AndroidOS to express each function. These components can call each other by inter-component communication using the intent. In this case, binder realizes inter-component communication. In this section, we explain the two components related to inter-component communication, intent and content provider.
• Intent An intent is a kind of message used in intercomponent communication between activities or services. Each activity of the Android application is isolated from other activities. It is impossible to invoke an code which implements one activity from another activity code directly. Here, an intent realizes the function invocation between component. Furthermore, an intent is also used to pass or require data from other components.
• Content Provider
Content provider is used in order to open the data which a certain application holds to other applications. As stated in advance, it is impossible to refer to other applications for each application in the AndroidOS environment. Then, to provide data to other applications, a developer implements content provider in his application. For example, some content providers are incorporated into a telephone call log or browser bookmark application as standard applications of Android, and their data can be referred to from other applications.
3) Third-Party Modules:
In the same way as other OSs, modules for Android platforms are developed and published by third party. Among the third party modules, The most typical one is the advertising module. Many of application developers of Android have got the profits from advertisements. These advertisements are distributed as a black-box module by advertising publisher. And, an application developer acquires their profits by incorporating such advertisement into their applications. However, when an advertising module is incorporated into an Android application, some problems emerge. For example, modules perform operations which an application developer does not expect or modules can use the permission authority which that application requires for.
B. Binder
Binder is a driver which offers the functionality to communicate between processes. Even if some processes are in the same application, they run on separate area. Moreover, there is a possibility that activities and services respectively run on different processes in the application. Binder driver is used when exchanging information between these different processes. In this case, communications are controlled by the framework layer located above the kernel. Although a user doesn't use Binder directly, it plays an important role in interprocess communication.
C. AIDL
In Android, one process cannot usually access memory of other processes. Therefore, if a process wants to obtain data from other processes, interprocess communication is necessary. AIDL(Android Interface Definition Language) is an interface definition language used to generate some codes [3] . These codes undertake the communication between two processes possible using interprocess communication realized with Binder.
D. Android API
API, which means "Application Programming Interface", is an interface to access function from the library intended for the OS and for the programming language of the applications. Functions used in many applications are offered within the application framework of Android through API. Because it is unnecessary to develop functions offered by API, development of application becomes easy with API. Some of Android APIs also offer functions which serve as a base of the OS.
III. ANDROID SECURITY MECHANISMS
In Android, several security mechanisms are provided for security enhancement. These mechanisms are based on the factors stated in Section II. In this section, we will explain these security mechanisms.
A. Application Isolation
In Android, sandbox is formed using isolating mechanism by a Linux process. Therefore, an application cannot access other applications' data or functions directly.
B. API Access Control
The authority attribute is attached to a part of APIs, and if an application doesn't have required attribute, the application cannot invoke correspond API. This attribute is called "Permission". Permission mechanism is an access control mechanism to control invocation of API or access to resource in AndroidOS. If a developer implements specific behavior in an application, he must declare corresponding permission in manifest file. For example, if he wants to make an application to get contact data, it is necessary to describe "READ CONTACTS" permission in manifest file. Also, in inter-component communication, specific permission is required. When an application acquires some data from other applications via intercomponents communication, correspond permission may be required to access content provider. This mechanism has imposed restrictions on operations of applications.
C. Installation Process
When a user installs an application, he can see a list of permissions required by the application. He can confirm the authority which the application has and predict the potential threats it has from this list. So, if he recognizes the potential threats of the application, he can decide not to install it. These permissions are described in manifest file.
D. Inter-Component Communication
Because each application is isolated in sandbox mechanism, they cannot communicate directly. To achieve communication between two applications in AndroidOS, inter-component communication is necessary. This intercomponent communication is realized by binder.
IV. EXISTING MALWARE AND DETECTION METHOD

A. Android Malware
Malware is an application which performs a malicious action, such as causing a leakage of privacy information or making data destroyed. Malware is developed according to an environment with many targets. Therefore, malware for Windows with many users have accounted for a large percentage of entire malware until now. However, malware developer's interest is moved over to Android OS rapidly. According to G Data Malware Report -Half yearly report January -June 2011 - [7] , during the first half of 2011 from the second half of 2010, malware that target smartphones with a focus on Android had increased from 55 to 803.
A large majority of malware is targeting Windows OS even now. However, considering the kind of information stored in Android devices is important personal information. It is the intrinsic problem for mobile terminals. These terminals have much private information, such as phone number or subscriber ID, mail addresses. Leakage of this private information may result in serious damage to its user.
There are many services and researches on dynamic security verification schemes for Android application. Google operates its own official Android application marketplace named Google Play [12] . It offers Bouncer [9] that inspects application security prior to distribute it on the marketplace. It has been reported to have a certain effect to reduce malware applications. On the other hand, it is reported the way to dissect the Bouncer system [11] .
B. Static Analysis
Static analysis is a program analysis method which analyzes a program without performing an executable file. It takes source code, bytecode of application as input. These codes are generated by reverse engineering tools [20] [21] [22] [23] . As static analysis method, there are many certification methods are proposed. Kim, et al. [26] proposed a static analyzing method that detects privacy leakage from Android terminal. It deals with application bytecode. Mann, et al. [29] proposed another static analysis framework. It implements a security type system for tracking explicit information flows.
Vidas et al. [28] focus the problem that many applications request permissions that are not used for the application execute. They proposed a method that statically analyzes the differences between requested permissions and actually used them.
C. Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis is a program analysis method which checks what kind of action the application is carrying out by actually executing the application to be inspected. Because application is actually run unlike static analysis and it is inspected based on the action, malware can be detected even when the source code is obfuscated, or when the code for an attack is placed outside the application code. TaintDroid [8] and AppFence [10] are dynamic analysis methods using information flow tracking. TaintDroid monitors interprocess communications, and if information is sent out TaintDroid alerts that event. AppFence implements two information protection methods. First, it substitutes shadow data contains private information to be protected. Second, it intercepts the network system call and filters data to prevent exfiltration of private information. Both of them have realized the dynamic analysis by modifying the Android kernel.
A logging system is used as a way of dynamic analysis. Isohara et al. proposed a logging system in Android [18] . System calls are collected as log data in the kernel level. These log data are analyzed with signature of threats to inspect the application's behavior. However, a problem is that action without system call is difficult to detect.
D. Other Methodologies
Some of malware is impersonating other popular applications. It is constructed based on original application, but grafted malicious code or library to. Most of them are registered in marketplaces with misleading name and priced cheaper than original application. It has a noteworthy advantage. Because of notability of the original application, such malware is easy to attract many user's attention and remove a sense of vigilance. Malware developer can propagate the copy of malware expeditiously.
Potharaju [16] analyzed such applications. It examines symbol table and AST of application and determines whether the application is plagiarized or not.
As a part of application testing, fuzzing [24] is proposed to apply Android application. Android's Monkey [19] generate random input pattern and reveal the vulnerability of application.
E. Non-Android Platforms
Some of researches target the mobile platform other than Android. Especially, iOS has a strong share in the smartphone platform market. However, researches on iOS security are much less when compared to Android. iOS application market is controlled firmly by the OS vendor and its market is one and only one for iOS application. Furthermore, unlike Android, iOS is a closed software. Therefore, analyzing the detail or modification is not easy.
PiOS [13] targeted iOS security and focuses static analysis approach. It analyses Objective-C binary and builds control-flow graph of application. PSiOS [14] took resemble approach and extends the coverage of software can be analyzed. Furthermore, PSiOS enforces control-flow integrity (CFI) [15] to countermeasure against controlflow attack.
WindowsPhone is the another mobile OS, but study about its security is fewer than iOS. It is presumed that due to the market share of it.
Xiao et al. [27] proposed static information-flow analysis method for WindowsPhone. Livshits et al. [17] studied on statically analysis method of WindowsPhone application security. It finds where the accessing potentially sensitive information within terminal and decides where to insert consent dialogs.
V. DESIGN OF RECORD METHOD OF PROCESS OPERATION USING LOGGING MECHANISM
A. Record Method of Process Operation
In Android, strace is a debugging utility that supervises the system calls issued by a program. In the process action recording method using this strace, the system call about the API cannot be recorded if the API is belonged to TelephonyManager class, This is because the information is called without using a service of the kernel, when using API of a TelephonyManager class.
In our proposal method, we insert a code that invokes Log.v method into the application framework of AndroidOS, and add it so that event logs may be output. And when an application acquires the phoneID through API, the event log is recorded, and we use a method of performing detection of information retrieval based on that log. There is a related work focusing on logging method [18] . Isohara et al. also implemented logging of Android application's behavior. However, their method is implemented within kernel layer focusing on Android system calls. On the other hand, our proposal method is implemented within Android framework layer focusing on API invocation. For this reason, our method can detect applications' behaviors which don't generate system calls. Furthermore, malicious application developer cannot avoid API logging by our method, because our method is implemented within Android framework layer and they cannot interfere with this layer.
APIs which record logs are prepared within the application framework of AndroidOS. These logs can be viewed using the function called logcat. In this experiment, logs are collected and analyzed, which are output from a Log.v() method of the Log class. This method is implemented in the layer which uses Java language in application framework.
We examined interprocess communications which occur when using APIs of TelephonyManager class. As a result, it turned out that processes and methods communicate in the procedure as shown in a Figure 2 .
The approach of checking which method is invoked by making log output is a general technique performed in other OS. When performing one application in Android, it is always run on independent Dalvik VM. Therefore, an application cannot communicate with other processes directly, and the application must use a driver called Binder. Then, we set a code that outputs a log in programs which perform this interprocess communication, and when an application invokes API, we detected and specified it based on the log information. This is the new point in this proposal method. With this method, retrieved information can be checked by seeing .aidl file without searching for the part which reads each information directly. In this experiment, after an application is executed, invoked API can be specified using the information acquired from the event log.
In this paper, the experiment was carried out for API contained in the IPhoneSubInfo.aidl file treating important information such as telephone number or subscriber ID. Concretely, at first the Log class of an android.util package is imported to IPhoneSubInfo.java file. Then, the code which outputs a log to an onTransact method is inserted. OS is recompiled after that. Application which invokes some APIs is installed to the emulator, and it is actually executed. From obtained event logs, we focus on the variable named code used in onTransact. Table I shows the conversion table of the information about API contained in an IPhoneSubInfo.aidl file and each API. In this paper, experiments are not carried out for getLine1AlphaTag() and getCompleteVoiceMailNumber(). The reasons are the following two.
• In spite of being implemented in TelephonyManager.java, these two methods are undocumented as methods of the TelephonyManager class in the site of Android Developer.
• If we try to use these methods as methods of a TelephonyManager class in an application, the error message that it is undefined within TelephonyManager will come out. From these reasons, experiments are carried out for seven APIs except the previously mentioned two.
B. Abstract of Experiment
The goal of these experiments is not the static analysis that decompiles application and analyzes a source code but the dynamic analysis that detects information leakages by actually running the application and taking event logs. In order to prevent from being detected by anti malware software, recent malwares obfuscate itself to make such an analysis difficult, or cause information leakages in cooperation with external server using webkit. The reason for using dynamic analysis in this paper is because it can deal with situations that static analysis cannot.
From the result of the record method using strace, it is predicted that personal information acquired by APIs of TelephonyManager is not retrieved by the kernel, but passed from other information managing processes. So, we focus on Binder driver which has an important role in interprocess communication. In this paper, we carried out the experiment which detects that event when APIs described in IPhoneSubInfor.aidl are invoked. We inserted a code that invokes Log.v methods which outputs a log message into onTransact method in IPhoneSubInfo class invoked only when these APIs are invoked. Then, we tried to specify the invoked API from the event logs. An argument called code exists in onTransact method of IPhoneSubInfo class. OnTransact method judges which API invoked information from this code value. Therefore, we think that we can specify which API is invoked from the event log of onTransact method and code variable. Figure 3 shows an inserted code outputting an event log into IPhoneSubInfo.java. The place where a logging code is inserted was decided in consideration of the following conditions.
C. Proposal Method
• It is not a method performed in the same process as an application. The getDeviceId() method of TelephonyManager class is run in the same process as the application. Such a method can be incorporated as a library in application by developer when application is developed. In the case of inserting the code which outputs the event log into getDeviceId() method, if a malware developer defines a method working similarly as getDeviceId() in that application and executes the method, information is retrieved without outputting the log. Therefore, it is very important to insert the code which outputs the log into a method running on a process which is not same as the application's process.
• API which invoked the method can be specified
Even if a log is output from the code inserted into the program, this method is not realized if which API was invoked by the application cannot be checked from the log.
• Proposal method can be used to detect as many APIs as possible If the code which outputs a log is inserted into each API method (e.g. getDeviceId()), only that information can be monitored.
As a result of considering these three conditions, we concluded that a suitable inserted place should be onTransact method of IPhoneSubInfo class. There are some reasons for this decision. onTransact method doesn't run on the same process as application. Then, because the order of methods defined in IPhoneSubInfo.aidl file and value of code variable are corresponded, it is possible to judge which API was invoked. This is because code variable is used within a switch statement in IPhoneSubInfo class. Furthermore, nine APIs defined in IPhoneSubInfo.aidl can be inspected with this method.
There is also an advantage that APIs which don't issue system call can be detected. In existing research, the detection of malware is performed by logging system call when using dynamic analysis [6] . However, in such a method, it is difficult to detect APIs which don't publish system call when running. On the other hand, because we focus on interprocess communication which occurs when the API is invoked, and insert a code which outputs the log when method is invoked, it becomes possible to realize detection of information retrieval without system call.
D. Experimental Procedure
1) Building of the source code
The make command is used to build the source code. IPhoneSubInfo.java file is automatically generated from IPhoneSubInfo.aidl file at this time. 2) Insertion of a code which outputs a log Figure 3 shows modified IPhoneSubInfo.java to output the event log. This program outputs a log message which can be seen with Logcat view. Log.v is a method which outputs a log of a detailed message. There are other methods about log. Log.e outputs a log about error, Log.w outputs a log of warning, Log.i outputs a log about information, and Log.d outputs a log of the debug message. Fundamentally, usage of these methods is the same. String indicating tag is set as first argument and string which should be output as a log message is set as second argument. The differences among these five methods are found in use, and they are properly used so that acknowledgement of logs becomes convenient. In this experiment, a log message includes two contents. First content is a character string called IPhoneSubInfo.onTransact. And, second content is a value of code variable, which indicates a kind of privacy information acquired by an application.
3) Rebuild
After rewriting and saving IPhoneSubInfo.java file, build is performed again.
4) Running application on the emulator
This experiment is entirely conducted on the emulator.
5) Reference of logs
Collected Logs are referred using Dalvik Debug Monitor Service tool. We described and considered the results from these collected logs. 
E. Result
A kind of information acquired by API could be detected from output logs. Table II shows the correspondence of APIs used in experiment to code variables. This corresponds with the order of method defined in IPhoneSubInfo.aidl file. This shows that we can know code variables corresponding to each method from AndroidOS source code. Figure 4 shows that logs output when getDeviceId() method is executed. The emphasized line in Figure 4 is a log message which outputs the necessary information in our proposal method.
F. Consideration
This experiment showed that detection and specification of API invoked from application can be possible. In this experiment, we inserted the code which outputs a log into onTransact method of IPhoneSubInfo class because we focus on APIs defined in IPhoneSubInfo.aidl. It is thought that APIs which are not mentioned in this paper are also defined in aidl file if they execute interprocess communication. Therefore, action of API is detectable by discovering the aidl file and conducting the same experiment as this one.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a detection method of phoneID acquisition using logcat is proposed. With this method, it is possible to detect obfuscated applications which cannot be detected with static analysis, or phoneID acquisition of an application which sets attack code in an external server. The phoneID acquisition of API which cannot be detected with dynamic analysis using strace could be detected. Because we focus on the behavior of applications in our method, it is unnecessary to acquire signatures of malwares in advance. Therefore, unknown malwares can be detected with proposal method. Moreover, the system which outputs the log in the proposal method is completely independent of the structure of application thanks to the mechanism which retrieves phoneID as shown in Figure 2 . For this reason, a malicious developer is unable to avoid the analysis by this technique.
In a practical use, the proposal method should be used by marketplace operator. One of the reasons is that the proposal method has no real-time properties. The proposal detection method needs to be performed before a user runs an application on his device because the method grasps the behavior of an application from the log output. Another reason is that the proposal method needs to rebuild AndroidOS and to prepare linux system for the analysis. From these reasons, the proposal method should be used in the marketplace operator's side.
As for future work, the distinction between malwares and legitimate applications is considered. This method detects all applications that acquire phoneID through API on the characteristics. When actually used, it is necessary to extract only malware from these applications and specify it. In this paper, we carried out experiments only about API defined in IPhoneSubInfo.aidl. However, we didn't carry out experiments about other APIs. As a future subject, we must confirm if proposal method can be applied to detection of other APIs. log output from program inserted into onTransact method of IPhoneSubInfo.java Figure 4 . Log output when executing getDeviceId() method
